Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Archive for the ‘shitigroup’ Category

The credit crisis has separated true libertarians from phony libertarians, and separated true liberals from phony liberals.

The phony liberals have inadvertently mocked themselves throughout the entire credit crisis, manning the barricades to defend the greatest act of socialism for the rich in US history. Ditto for supposed “libertarians,” eg Robert Rubin, Bruce Kovner, and the vast majority of institutional Wall Street which found itself drowning in its own quagmire, and changed their tune faster than you can say “WTF.”

Anyway, here’s the link.

The editorial in question is by Robert J. Shiller, who is a professor of economics and finance and famous analyst of speculative bubbles. A specialist in behavioral economics, in the application of psychology to understanding financial markets. A co-founder of Case Shiller Weiss, that house price index we talk about a lot. His editorial, “The Scars of Losing a Home,” speaks not of lofty academic economic concepts but of human sympathy, of things that are “really important.” With references from famous academic psychologists. I haven’t taken this kind of a tiger by the tail since I went after Austan Goolsbee last year.

Yes, it was only a year ago that the distinguished Dr. Goolsbee wrote this on the same editorial page:

And do not forget that the vast majority of even subprime borrowers have been making their payments. Indeed, fewer than 15 percent of borrowers in this most risky group have even been delinquent on a payment, much less defaulted.

When contemplating ways to prevent excessive mortgages for the 13 percent of subprime borrowers whose loans go sour, regulators must be careful that they do not wreck the ability of the other 87 percent to obtain mortgages.

For be it ever so humble, there really is no place like home, even if it does come with a balloon payment mortgage.

I actually think Goolsbee’s piece was the high-water-mark of the “subprime helps the poor” talking point. You certainly don’t hear much about that these days. Less than two months after Dr. Goolsbee’s earnest op-ed, we got an interview in the very same NYT with one Bill Dallas, CEO of the famously defunct Ownit Mortgage, effusively testifying to his own burning desire to help out the unfortunate in a way that finally put paid to the respectability of that line (“‘I am passionate about the normal person owning a home,’ said Mr. Dallas, who is also chairman of the Fox Sports Grill restaurant chain and manages the business interests of the Olsen twins. ‘I think owning a home solves all their problems.'”) Plus by now we’ve got some numbers on the 2007 mortgage vintage, the one that Dr. Goolsbee was afraid wasn’t going to ever materialize if we tightened up lending standards too much. A year ago we were looking at a 13% subprime ARM delinquency rate. Per Moody’s (no link) the Q4 07 subprime ARM delinquencies were running 20.02%. And that is not, you know, “just” another 7%. By now, those delinquent borrowers in Goolsbee’s 13% have probably mostly been foreclosed upon and are off the books. The 20% or so who are now delinquent were either part of the 87% that Goolsbee thought were “successful homeowners” last year, or else they’re those lucky duckies who bought homes after the publication date of Goolsbee’s plea that we not tighten standards too much.

Of course Shiller wasn’t exactly spending his time a year ago defending the subprime mortgage industry on the grounds that it put poor and minority people into ever-so-humble homes with balloons attached. I seem to recall him mostly arguing that homebuyers were engaged in a speculative mania. In a June 2007 interview:

Well, human thinking is built around stories, and the story that has sustained the housing boom is that homes are like stocks. Buy one anywhere and it’ll go up. It’s the easiest way to get rich.

At the time, that kind of statement struck some of us, at least, as not possibly the entire story either, but in any event a useful corrective to the saccharine silliness of the “Ownership Society” and Bill Dallas solving everyone’s problems by letting them put Roots in a Community (for only five points in YSP).

So I hope I can be just a tad startled by the New Shiller:

Homeownership is thus an extension of self; if one owns a part of a country, one tends to feel at one with that country. Policy makers around the world have long known that, and hence have supported the growth of homeownership.

MAYBE that’s why President Bush’s “Ownership Society” theme had such resonance in his 2004 re-election campaign. People instinctively understand that homeownership conveys good feelings about belonging in our society, and that such feelings matter enormously, not only to our economic success but also to the pleasure we can take in it.

So it’s no longer irrational exuberance or plain old speculating; it’s now an instinctive affirmation of some eternal verity of the human psyche? The ultimate patriotism: the definition of self so tied up in ownership of a slice of the motherland that to rent becomes not only psychologically dangerous–these people without selves can’t be up to anything good–but politically dangerous as well? Is it possible that Shiller can mean what he is writing here?

If you just scanned the first few paragraphs of Shiller’s op-ed you might come away with the impression of a sincere but somewhat hackneyed plea for us all to have a bit of sympathy for the foreclosed among us, foreclosure not in anyone’s experience being a walk in the park. Fair enough. It being Sunday in America, I suspect millions of us are being treated to exhortations to take a kinder view of the unfortunate than we often do; we need those exhortations; we are often lacking in sympathy. Hands up all who disagree.

But you keep reading and you find Shiller trying to explain the “trauma” of foreclosure. And that’s where this really gets weird:

Now, let’s take the other perspective — and examine some arguments against the stern view. They have to do with the psychological effects of strict enforcement of a mortgage contract, and economists and people in business may need to be reminded of them. After all, too much attention to abstract economic statistics just might make us overlook what is really important.

First, we have to consider that we cannot squarely place the blame for the current mortgage mess on the homeowner. It seems to be shared among mortgage brokers, mortgage originators, appraisers, regulatory agencies, securities ratings agencies, the chairman of the Federal Reserve and the president of the United States (who did not issue any warnings, but instead has consistently extolled the virtues of homeownership).

Because homeowners facing foreclosure must bear the brunt of the pain, they naturally feel indignation when all of these other parties continue to lead comfortable, even affluent lives. Trying to enforce mortgage contracts may thus have a perverse effect: instead of teaching homeowners that they should respect the contracts they sign, it may incline them to take a cynical view of the whole mess.

We need to modify mortgage contracts to keep homeowners from becoming cynical? That’s somehow more respectable an idea than the one saying we should throw them out on the street to “teach them a lesson”? If Shiller is serious that all those other parties are “to blame,” then why isn’t the obvious solution to throw them out on the street? There seems to be an assumption here that nothing can be done to punish those who are “really” to blame, so we’re left managing the psyches of those who can be punished. And that’s not cynical?

This the point at which Shiller dredges up the most stunningly unfortunate quote from William effing James (1890) to define the “fundamental” psychology of homeownership:

Homeownership is fundamental part of a sense of belonging to a country. The psychologist William James wrote in 1890 that “a man’s Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank account.”

Now, that’s breath-taking. Horses. Yachts. His wife and his children. Ancestors. The whole late-Victorian wealthy male WASP defining the “Self” (with a capital!) as the wealthy male WASP surveying his extensive possessions, an oddly-assorted list that ranks the family and friends somewhere after the clothes and the house. (Yes, James did that on purpose.) The kind of sentiment that was a caricature of the late-Victorian male even in 1890. And Shiller drags this out in aid of generating sympathy for homeowners? Really? You couldn’t find some psychological insight about the emotional relationship of people to their homes that doesn’t speak the language of the male ego surveying his domain, sizing himself up against all the other males to see where he ranks?

(James on the psychological effect of losing one’s property: ” . . . although it is true that a part of our depression at the loss of possessions is due to our feeling that we must now go without certain goods that we expected the possessions to bring in their train, yet in every case there remains, over and above this, a sense of the shrinkage of our personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to nothingness, which is a psychological phenomenon by itself. We are all at once assimilated to the tramps and poor devils whom we so despise, and at the same time removed farther than ever away from the happy sons of earth who lord it over land and sea and men in the full-blown lustihood that wealth and power can give, and before whom, stiffen ourselves as we will by appealing to anti-snobbish first principles, we cannot escape an emotion, open or sneaking, of respect and dread.”)

I’m actually, you know, in favor of some sympathy for homeowners, but one thing that does get in the way of that for a lot of us is, well, the rather disgusting shallowness that a lot of them displayed on the way up. There is this whole part of our culture that has sprung into being since 1890 that takes a rather severe view of conspicuous consumption, unbridled materialism, and totally self-defeating use of debt to buy McMansions, if not yachts. We were treated to a fair amount of that kind of thing in the last few years. In fact, we had Dr. Shiller explaining to us last year that a lot of folks just wanted to get rich, quick, in real estate.

It is undeniably true, I assert, that not everyone was a speculatin’ spend-thrift maxing out the HELOCs to buy more toys, and that part of our problem today with public opinion is that we extend our (quite proper) disgust for these latter-day Yuppies to the entire class “homeowner.” But it is surely an odd way to engage our sympathies for the non-speculator class to speak of it in Jamesian terms as the man whose self is defined by his Stuff, and whose psychological pain is felt most acutely when he recognizes that he is now just like the riff-raff.

It’s worse than odd–it’s downright reactionary–to then go on to that evocation of homeownership as good citizenship and good citizenship as “feel[ing] at one with [the] country.” This puts a rather sinister light on Shiller’s earlier insistence that we need to make sure people don’t get too “cynical.”

I see that Yves at naked capitalism was just as disgusted by Shiller as I am:

Now admittedly, this is not a validated instrument, but a widely used stress scoring test puts loss of spouse as 100 and divorce at 73. Foreclosure is 30, below sex difficulties (39), pregnancy (40), or personal injury (53). Change in residence is 20.

Note that if we as a society were worried about psychological damage, being fired (47) is far worse than foreclosure (30), and if it leads to a change in financial status (38) and/or change to a different line of work (36) those are separate, additive stress factors. Yet policy-makers have no qualms about advocating more open trade even though it produces industry restructurings that produce unemployment that does more psychological damage than foreclosures. As a society, we’ll pursue efficiency that first cost blue collar jobs, and now that we’ve gotten inured to that, white collar ones as well (although Alan Blinder draws the line there).

But efficiency arguments don’t apply to housing since we are sentimental about it. And it’s that sentimentality that bears examination, since it engendered policies that helped produce this mess.

I would only add that we are about five years too far into a war that has not made a majority of us “feel at one with that country.” I think of another really important policy change we could be pursuing right now to shore up everyone’s psychological estrangement from their patriotic self-satisfaction. But “efficiency arguments” don’t apply to wars, either.

My fellow bleeding heart liberals like Goolsbee found themselves defending the subprime industry in the name of increasing minority homeownership. Now we’re treated to the spectacle of Shiller arguing for homeowner bailout legislation in the same terms that Bush used to defend the “Ownership Society.” Housing policy, I gather, makes strange bedfellows. It certainly makes strange editorials.

Shiller’s unwitting self-parody embodies the principle at the heart of the TAF and every other tentacle of the Wall Street bailout. Far more than “economist statistics which can cause us to lose sight of what’s really important,” what’s REALLY important is protection of those Selves which include “lands and horses, and yacht and bank account.”

You can *not* make this stuff up.

Pardon my French, but our economy is being run by f*cking idiots.

Read Full Post »

via

[…]

Net loss for the first quarter of 2008 was $151 million, compared to a net loss of $2.5 billion in the fourth quarter of 2007. Improved results reflect reduced losses related to a change in the guarantee obligation valuation methodology implemented under SFAS No. 157, “Fair Value Measurements” (SFAS 157), which better aligns revenue recognition with the economic release from risk under the guarantee. As a result, effective January 1, 2008, the company no longer records estimates of deferred gains or immediate losses recognized upon issuances of single-family Mortgage Participation Certificates (PCs) and Structured Securities in guarantor swap transactions through losses on certain credit guarantees, a component of non-interest expense. In the fourth quarter of 2007, the company incurred $1.3 billion in losses on certain credit guarantees.

Improved results also reflect lower interest-rate related mark-to-market losses as a result of the company’s adoption of SFAS No. 159, “The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities – Including an amendment of FASB Statement No. 115” (SFAS 159). Effective January 1, 2008, the company elected the fair value option for certain available-for-sale mortgage-related securities and its foreign-currency denominated debt. Upon adoption of SFAS 159, the company recognized a $1.0 billion after-tax increase to its beginning retained earnings at January 1, 2008. See the Appendix for more detail on the adoption of SFAS 157 and SFAS 159. [in other words, mark to market is out the window–ed]

[…]

Portfolio Activity and Balances

Year-to-date through April 30, 2008, the company estimates that the unpaid principal balance of the company’s retained portfolio increased at an annualized rate of about 7 percent to approximately $738 billion.

During the month of April 2008, the company estimates that the amount of retained portfolio mortgage purchase and sales agreements entered into totaled approximately $43 billion.

The company estimates that its total credit guarantee portfolio increased at an annualized rate of about 10 percent to approximately $1.8 trillion year-to-date through April 30, 2008.

At March 31, 2008, Freddie Mac estimates that its single-family serious delinquency (i.e., 90 plus days late) rate for non-credit enhanced, credit enhanced and all loans was approximately 0.54 percent, 1.81 percent and 0.77 percent, respectively.

Fair Value of Net Assets

The company’s attribution of changes in fair value relies on models, assumptions and other measurement techniques that evolve over time.

At March 31, 2008, the fair value of net assets was ($5.2) billion as compared to $12.6 billion at December 31, 2007, reflecting a net after-tax reduction of $17.8 billion. This change in fair value of net assets includes the payment of preferred and common stock dividends during the first quarter of 2008.

The change in fair value of net assets includes a pre-tax reduction in fair value of $28.8 billion as a result of net mortgage-to-debt OAS widening, partially offset by a pre-tax increase in fair value related to core spread income in the first quarter of 2008. In addition, the company estimates that the change in fair value of its credit guarantee activities resulted in a pre-tax reduction of $3.0 billion. …

A company with a $1.8trn credit guarantee portfolio has net asset FV at -5.2 billion, down $20 billion in three months after accounting for the $2.6bn in accounting rule changes. Given that we’re now reading of houses in Atlanta selling for under $20,000 which local property tax auditors insist on valuing at $100,000, “fair value according to Freddie” and “fair value according to the market” are two very different things, which won’t stop racing apart any time soon.

I’m sure Obama will love being given the job of bailout out Freddie once he’s inaugurated.

Some “change” that will be.

Read Full Post »

via

The Bank of England has imposed a permanent news blackout on its £50bn-plus plan to ease the credit crunch.

Ferocious and unprecedented secrecy means taxpayers will never know the names of the banks that have been supported through the special liquidity scheme, which was unveiled by Bank Governor Mervyn King last week.

Requests under the Freedom of Information Act are to be denied. Details will be kept secret even after 30 years – the period after which all but the most sensitive state documents are released.

Any Bank of England employee leaking the names of institutions involved will face court action for breach of contract.

Even a figure for the overall amount advanced will not be published until October. Meanwhile the Bank is expected to issue at least £50bn of Treasury bills to banks in exchange for their mortgages – entirely in secret.

This hypersensitive official stance is thought to be a response to the events of last year when a huge stigma was attached to any lender suspected of going to the Bank for cash help.

The scheme is intended to steady the markets, but it is feared that reports of banks making widespread use of the facility could trigger further instability.

Barclays and HBoS have both confirmed they will use the Bank of England scheme. ‘We welcome the Bank facility and we will participate in it,’ confirmed Andy Hornby, chief executive of HBoS.

Other banks declined to comment, but it is expected that this week all of the leading banks, with the exception of Lloyds TSB, will tender some of their mortgages to the Bank of England.

HBoS confirmed last week it had packaged up £9bn of mortgages ready either for securitisation – in effect, selling them on in the wholesale financial markets – or to be offered to the Bank in return for Treasury bills.

The scheme, drawn up by King and approved by Chancellor Alistair Darling, aims to improve banks’ liquidity by temporarily swapping bundles of mortgages and credit card debt for Treasury bills, which are short-dated Government debt that matures within nine months.

The scheme will run for three years so these bills will be replaced by new ones when required.

Under the plan, bills will be exchanged only for securities rated triple-A – the highest possible grade of security – by at least two of the three big ratings agencies, Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.

It would not normally be considered acceptable for big companies to arrange billions of pounds of financial support without telling their shareholders.

But one source close to major institutional investors said: ‘I can see why there may be a case for secrecy.

‘It may be the lesser of two evils.’

The £50bn or more of Treasury bills involved will dwarf the £17.6bn currently in issue, but the authorities are adamant this will not destabilise the Government debt market.

Read Full Post »

The bailout of Bear Stearns was, in effect, a bailout of JPMorgan Chase.

Chase wrote the most credit default swaps of anyone. They also had by far the largest number of open but uncleared swaps (i.e., JPMC sells one side of the swap to a counterparty, but cannot spin off its own side — overwhelmingly, the “BSC will not default” side of the default-swap bet — because no market participants *wanted* credit default swaps). In other words they were a huge risk for JPMC.

Of course, (I think) nobody knows the exact distribution of swaps JPMC had regarding Bear Stearns. However, it’s almost certain that a preponderance of the credit default swaps were Bear Stearns swaps, considering how few people there were who would bet that Bear wouldn’t default.

And everyone on the other side of JPMC’s open, uncleared BSC credit default swaps was defrauded. They paid for default protection, and the unprecedented, extralegal, Fed-brokered absorption of BSC by JPMC defrauded all of those people.

Indirectly, everyone who purchased financial default swaps has been defrauded, because the Fed now accepts garbage for whatever you say its value is — as long as you’re one of the “sweet 16” broker dealers. None of the banks will ever go bankrupt, which means that all the private sector actors who saw BSC coming were defrauded, while JPM, the primary market maker of credit default swaps which greased the wheels with merry abandon, gets bailed out.

And the Fed’s “bailout,” in the form of exchanging AAA Treasuries for “AAA” (garbage) mortgage-backed securities, is a tax on everybody who was stupid enough to trust the “full faith and credit of the United States Treasury.”

The credit default swap market — the venue for private buying and selling of insurance against default — has been inflated out of existence, because its largest (financials) segment has been rendered too big to fail by a moronic/compliant Fed. What is all that default protection worth now? Nothing.

This dose of regulatory fascism (the invalidation of a tens of trillions of dollar market), has, by the way, been brought to you by the Republicans.

It’s always good to put the Greenspan – Rubin – Bernanke free-base, free-lunch, free market brand of capitalism in perspective: it’s a fraud.

Let’s just say that if Paulson or Bernanke or Jamie Dimon happened to be black, and walking out of a bank, he’d be shot dead on sight or handed 25 years in the slammer, for robbery (as well as aggravated assault with an assault weapon, etc).

(TOH to “mystery” for that lesson …)

Oh, by the way, this isn’t the first type of “screw the intelligent bears” move Bernanke has pulled. Remember the bogus “discount rate” cut that Bernanke announced half an hour before close of business last Friday? All those options purchased by all the intelligently bearish people were rendered worthless.

Read Full Post »

I didn’t post this article at first, because I thought the financial press was making a much bigger deal out of what seemed, to me, a fairly tepid critique of Bernanke’s actions.

April 8 (Bloomberg) — Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker questioned the central bank’s decision to rescue Bear Stearns Cos. with a $29 billion loan, saying it was at “the very edge” of its legal authority.

“The Federal Reserve has judged it necessary to take actions that extend to the very edge of its lawful and implied powers, transcending in the process certain long-embedded central banking principles and practices,” Volcker said in a speech to the Economic Club of New York.

Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke last month agreed to lend against Bear Stearns securities, paving the way for JPMorgan Chase & Co. to buy its Wall Street rival. Bernanke, who worked with Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson to broker the bailout, last week defended the move as necessary to prevent “severe” damage to financial markets.

Volcker, the Fed chairman from 1979 to 1987, had implicit criticism for U.S. regulators and market participants who allowed “excesses of subprime mortgages” to spread into “the mother of all crises.” The Fed’s Bear Stearns loan was unusual, he said.

“What appears to be in substance a direct transfer of mortgage and mortgage-backed securities of questionable pedigree from an investment bank to the Federal Reserve seems to test the time-honored central bank mantra in time of crisis: lend freely at high rates against good collateral; test it to the point of no return,” he said. …

The first three times I read that last sentence, it sounded like this in my head:

“… test the time-honored central bank mantra in time of crisis: lend freely at high rates against good collateral [and] test [lending freely at high rates against good collateral] to the point of no return” (as in, lend at high rates against good collateral until/unless something bad happens). Which seemed oddly dovish coming from Volcker.

However, I’m pretty sure that’s not what Volcker meant, but rather, “… test the time-honored central bank mantra in time of crisis — lend freely at high rates against good collateral — test [the mantra of good collateral] to the point of no return.” (As in, “no return” to the present Fed system.)

Maybe I’m just slowing down with age, and this was more obvious to others who read the article. But it makes more sense now, and comes across as a much more pointed critique of Bernanke.

Market-participant herd psychology baffles me. I guess every community suffers from echo-chamber effects sometimes, but it’s just strange how normally intelligent, independent, ahead-of-the-curve finance people such as Dick Bove, GaveKal, and so on, completely abandon their convictions and common sense during times of stress, and find any number of rationalizations for why perpetuating a bailout culture is “brilliant.”

So Volcker’s words are all the more valuable, in my book.

Read Full Post »

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard:

The Fed has been criticised for its rescue of Bear Stearns, which critics say has degenerated into a taxpayer gift to rich bankers.

A senior official at one of the Scandinavian central banks told The Daily Telegraph that Fed strategists had stepped up contacts to learn how Norway, Sweden and Finland managed their traumatic crisis from 1991 to 1993, which brought the region’s economy to its knees.

It is understood that Fed vice-chairman Don Kohn remains very concerned by the depth of the US crisis and is eyeing the Nordic approach for contingency options.

Scandinavia’s bank rescue proved successful and is now a model for central bankers, unlike Japan’s drawn-out response, where ailing banks were propped up in a half-public limbo for years.

While the responses varied in each Nordic country, there a was major effort to avoid the sort of “moral hazard” that has bedevilled efforts by the Fed and the Bank of England in trying to stabilise their banking systems.

Norway ensured that shareholders of insolvent lenders received nothing and the senior management was entirely purged. Two of the country’s top four banks – Christiania Bank and Fokus – were seized by force majeure.

“We were determined not to get caught in the game we’ve seen with Bear Stearns where shareholders make money out of the rescue,” said one Norwegian adviser.

“The law was amended so that we could take 100pc control of any bank where its equity had fallen below zero. Shareholders were left with nothing. It was very controversial,” he said.

Stefan Ingves, governor of Sweden’s Riksbank, said his country passed an act so it could seize banks where the capital adequacy ratio had fallen below 2pc. Efforts were also made to protect against “blackmail” by shareholders.

Mr Ingves said there were parallels with the US crisis, citing the use of off-balance sheet vehicles to speculate on property. All the Nordic banks were nursed back to health and refloated or merged.

The tough policies contrast with the Fed’s bail-out of Bear Stearns, where shareholders forced JP Morgan to increase its Fed-led rescue offer from $2 to $10 a share. Christopher Wood, chief strategist at brokers CLSA, says the Fed’s piecemeal approach has led to “appalling moral hazard”.

“Shareholders have been able to lobby for a higher share price only because the Fed took over the credit risk on $30bn of the investment bank’s dubious paper. The whole affair also amounts to a colossal subsidy for JP Morgan,” he said.

Any taxpayer bailout of the system needs to be combined with a massive purge of those not footing the bill for their own mistakes — banking management — and the complete slaughter of banking shareholders.

At the moment, Washington Mutual, Citigroup, and Countrywide are just three of the best-known “banks” whose debt to Uncle Sam — mostly to the Federal Home Loan Banks — exceeds their net assets. They are effectively the property of the US government.

A price must be paid. Under the free market ideal that never happens in real life, the banks fail, everyone freaks out for six months, and the economy experiences torrid growth afterwards.

In the real world, the future individuals of the (banking) institutions are forced to pay for the mistakes of the current institutional occupants. Future Wall Streeters will pay for the mistakes of today’s Wall Street by paying billions more in homage to stupid regulations, oversight that isn’t, and market share lost to more competitive, less cosseted overseas competitors.

The three regulatory options are as follows:

1) Do nothing; reward the bankers for their naked pursuit of risk without reward.

2) The aforementioned Nordic route.

3) A massive patchwork of new regulations and controls, which almost-exclusively subsidizes the institutional malfeasance of the past nine months at the cost of choking future Wall Street vibrancy.

The Nordic option is by far the most attractive of the three. It allocates responsibility, discourages future bad behavior, and punishes prior bad behavior. It keeps the system relatively healthy — assuming the banks are returned to private ownership within less than four years.

Read Full Post »

The SEC:

… Fair value assumes the exchange of assets or liabilities in orderly transactions. Under SFAS 157, it is appropriate for you to consider actual market prices, or observable inputs, even when the market is less liquid than historical market volumes, unless those prices are the result of a forced liquidation or distress sale. …

Considering that pretty much every credit market has been defined as a “forced liquidation or distressed sale,” this amounts to a gigantic escape hatch from any semblance of objectivity in terms of pricing garbage level 3 assets.

Read Full Post »

Older Posts »