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Archive for the ‘war’ Category

As noted here time and again, Iran has nothing to lose by waiting out the end of George Bush’s term.

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said May 29 that Iran thinks U.S. voters want to change the foreign policies of President George W. Bush, and he said that the present U.S. presidential campaigns make that clear, The Associated Press reported. Mottaki, who would not endorse a candidate, said that foreign policy would play an important part in the election of the next U.S. president.

Iran could not have had a better March-May. A rumored Israeli Gaza offensive, against Iran’s proxy Hamas, failed to materialize. Hezbollah, staked by Iran, was forced to go all-in in Lebanon, won, and has returned to a defensive crouch.

Mottaki’s announcement is a signal to Ahmadinejad’s domestic foes that Iraq is worth waiting for for a little while longer. He happens to be right.

US econo-political analysis is divided into two camps. The “mainstream” camp sees US growth figures as credible, and takes at face value the idea that the US, by sheer economic vitality, has avoided a recession. This school views US inflation as temporary. It views 10/90 “right track/wrong track” numbers as merely a dubious poll, a product of stampeding pessimism, spawned by the media’s sensationalizing of US malaise. This group has faith in government and banking institutions, and little faith in consumers’ ability to assess or predict their own behavior. Curiously, this group is also disproportionately Republican and “free-market.” It does not see much potential for an economic- or inflation-driven political upheaval in November 2008.

The “cynics,” e.g., Bill Gross, Mish Shedlock, and John Williams, trust consumers’ perceptions over the government’s. Cynics argue that consumers are telling the truth when they say how pessimistic they are, and trace the dissonance between official and consumer perceptions to vagaries of BLS unemployment and inflation accounting–a story flogged to death here, and much more persuasively on other sites.

The cynics see much higher potential for political upheaval in November 2008.

Apparently, so does Iran.

Bush Administration policy vis-a-vis Iran/Iraq usually means dialing up tensions over Iranian nukes and weapons supplies into Iraq, bringing up aircraft carriers, launching large operations against Iran’s Mehdi Army Iraqi proxy, slapping sanctions on Iranian banks, using its own militias to incinerate strategic people inside Iran, etc.

After Hezbollah routed the US alliance in Lebanon (followed by an abrupt end to the US/Iraqi crackdown on Sadr in Baghdad) one would assume that the Bush Administration policy of “we’d like to talk, but we’re happy to pull the trigger too” attitude has lost credibility. Iran is quietly leveraging its gains by edging the US out of Iraq:

May 29, 2008 1419 GMT
Senior Iraqi official Sa’ad Javad Qandil told Alalam television May 29 that a draft of an agreement to extend U.S. troops in Iraq beyond 2008 was problematic, especially any condition that would allow the U.S. to establish a military base there.

Predictably, Qandil is a member of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Teheran’s “mainstream” Iraq proxy (the Mehdi Army is, most of the time, its militant proxy). Hezbollah’s unanswered victory in Lebanon has ramifications across the entire region, not so much in the eyes of Americans as in the eyes of Arabs who were reminded, once again, that the personal bonds between Ahmadinejad and militia leaders can result in very quick and decisive action when Teheran’s interest are threatened.

Anyway, Iran hasn’t been deterred by US tough talk in the past, and there’s less reason than ever to think that louder tough talk will change Iran’s behavior at all. Lebanon has changed the game.

I would repeat my “sh*t or get off the pot” mantra about the US and Iran, but the US has backed down one too many times. I’m beginning to believe we should throw the Saudis the keys as soon as possible, to hedge against a probably adverse US election outcome while it’s still possible.

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During a somewhat heated argument with some Jewish friends over Israel’s recent backstabbing of the US, a national security hobbyist recommended the following article as a defense of recent Israeli policy. Phrases which jumped out at me are highlighted in bold.

Hizbollah’s Increased Strength: Risks and Opportunities for Israel, INSS Insight No. 57, May 26, 2008
Shalom, Zaki

One tangible aftermath of the Second Lebanon War and the agreement that concluded it is an increase in Hizbollah’s strength. [… …]

Since the end of the Second Lebanon War, Hizbollah has succeeded in rehabilitating its forces to a great extent. According to various reports, Hizbollah today has tens of thousands of missiles, some of them long range, and is capable of inflicting very serious damaged deep into Israel. Thus, the risks involved in Hizbollah taking control of Lebanon are quite apparent. Less apparent are the pluses that may emerge from this process.

[Hezbollah didn’t “rehabilitate” anything. Its victory in 2006 did not even require a full Hezbollah mobilization. 10,000 IDF soldiers were defeated by 3,000 Hezbollah fighters. At most 184 Hezbollah fighters were killed in the war — much less than the “at least 450” bandied about by Israeli propaganda.]

[…]

… For many years Lebanon has been ruled by moderate, pro-West leaders. This leadership views Hizbollah as a bitter and hostile rival, and it too is interested in clipping the organization’s wings. At the same time, Lebanese leaders are afraid of a confrontation, and in practice allow Hizbollah to operate against Israel in a “bloodletting” effort, while stressing their inability to restrain the organization. When Israel responds against Lebanon, the Lebanese leadership uses its good relations with Western countries, in particular the United States and the moderate Arab countries, to exert pressure on Israel not to harm it.

This phenomenon was evidenced in prominent fashion on July 12, 2006. In a Cabinet discussion held after the serious consequences of that day’s Hizbollah operation became clear, then-Chief of Staff Dan Halutz proposed attacking infrastructure installations in Lebanon, including electric plants, oil refineries, and water sources. His suggestion was supported by a number of ministers. However, the senior political echelon, and in particular the prime minister, defense minister, and minister of foreign affairs, vetoed the idea. The reason: unequivocal clarifications received by Israel that very same day from senior levels in the American administration and the British government to the effect that Israel must refrain from damaging Lebanese targets [1] because this might undermine the stability of the pro-Western government headed by Fouad Siniora. Consequently, the proposal was shelved.

We lack adequate tools to assess whether that proposal, if implemented, would have generated an essentially different outcome from the events of July-August 2006. Nonetheless, it is clear that an American-British veto of this option stemmed from the fact that the official government in Lebanon was pro-Western and enjoyed the support of the United States. The fact that Israel was not able to exercise the option to attack Lebanon represents a significant constraint on Israel’s freedom to maneuver.

Should Hizbollah in fact take control of Lebanon, Israel’s options of maneuvering vis-à-vis Hizbollah are significantly increased. It will become clear to all sides that no international element will get involved to protect Hizbollah from Israeli attacks. Obviously, this does not mean that Israel would necessarily attack Lebanon’s infrastructure should Hizbollah cast down the gauntlet. Beyond international constraints, the Israeli leadership also has to contend with a set of legal and normative, value-based constraints and restrictions that would make it very difficult indeed for Israel to take steps against civilian infrastructure.[2] This has become clear in Israel’s refraining from damaging the electrical and fuel infrastructures of the Gaza Strip under Hamas control. At the same time, there is no doubt that Hizbollah’s taking control of Lebanon would expand Israel’s ability to maneuver vis-à-vis Lebanon in case of another armed conflict, at least from the international perspective.

From Israel’s own perspective, Hizbollah is first and foremost a body representing a military threat against Israel. However, Hizbollah is also a powerful body with economic and financial assets, and an organization with far-reaching political ambitions. Therefore, in any military confrontation with Israel, if Hizbollah holds the reins of leadership it would conclude that there is nothing stopping Israel from severely damaging its assets. The very awareness of this fact, i.e., that there would not be anyone trying to delimit Israel’s scope of action in terms of damaging Lebanon, may cause it to refrain from a confrontation with Israel.

Beyond this, one may speculate that Hizbollah’s taking control of Lebanon will bring about a new awareness on the part of various international elements of the “Iranian threat.” To date, the concerns of the international community regarding Iran have focused on its intention to develop nuclear capabilities. Hizbollah’s taking control of Lebanon would bring the danger inherent in Iran into sharper relief, not only regarding the nuclear question but also vis-à-vis the stability of other pro-Western regimes in the region, chief among them Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Gulf states. Such a development might very well match the interests of the State of Israel.

[1] Not only is this immaterial (for reasons which I will soon explain), but it’s also an audacious exaggeration.

Very few people know the exact phrasing of the back-channel US request/ demand/ recommendation/ “directive” on the scope of Israel’s operations. [Since when was Israel a shackled vassal to US/UK politics?] One would think that collateral damage to Lebanon was of secondary importance to winning the war.

More importantly, however, Lebanon 2006 was an Israeli tactical, strategic, intellectual and logistical catastrophe, from top to bottom. Had Hezbollah’s military bandwidth been stretched by the conflict, a Western “veto” of strikes on Hezbollah assets such as power generators, etc., could have borne culpability.

However, Hezbollah’s capabilities were not remotely stretched. Hezbollah didn’t even call up its own reserves!

The US Army has at least one detailed dissection of Israel’s Second Lebanon War, by Matt Matthews of the US Army Combined Arms Center. It could be that politics could have obscured the mention of retrospectively adverse US “directives” in an Army study. That isn’t consistent with Army practice, but I will concede it for the sake of argument.

[2] is long-hand for, “We base our policy on what others think of us, not on what we believe best for our country; and anyway, our culture just doesn’t let us win wars anymore.” “One may speculate” that Israel has completely lost its martial vigor as well as touch with reality. But Nasrallah’s and Ahmadinejad’s vindication is no matter of speculation.

Without further ado, here’s a representative US Army assessment of Lebanon 2006:

[p. 25-26]

… Brigadier General Shimon Naveh’s Systemic Operational Design (SOD) was a tool intended to help IDF commanders plan their campaigns. Naveh founded the IDF’s Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI) in 1995. After years of work by Naveh and other intellectuals within the OTRI, SOD attempted to provide commanders with the aptitude necessary “to think critically, systemically and methodologically about 25 war fighting.” The design focused “on the concept of the ‘enemy’ and provides operational commanders with tools to conceptualize both their enemies and themselves for the purpose of designing suitable campaigns,” wrote a former OTRI member.38

Canadian Army officer L. Craig Dalton, who interviewed Naveh in 2006, described SOD as an “intellectual exercise that draws on the creative vision, experience, intuition, and judgment of commanders to provide a framework for the development of detailed operational plans.”39 For this new design, Naveh drew heavily on terminology from “post modern French philosophy, literary theory, architecture and psychology.” An IDF general explained SOD in the following way:

This space that you look at, this room that you look at, is nothing but your interpretation of it. Now, you can stretch the boundaries of your interpretation, but not in an unlimited fashion, after all, it must be bound by physics, as it contains buildings and alleys. The question is, how do you interpret the alley? Do you interpret the alley as a place, like every architect and every town planner does, to walk through, or do you interpret the alley as a place forbidden to walk through? This depends only on interpretation. We interpreted the alley as a place forbidden to walk through, and the window as a place forbidden to look through, because a weapon awaits us in the alley, and a booby trap awaits us behind the doors. This is because the enemy interprets space in a traditional, classical manner, and I do not want to obey this interpretation and fall into his trap. Not only do I not want to fall into his traps, I want to surprise him! This is the essence of war. I need to win. I need to emerge from an unexpected place. . . . This is why we opted for the methodology of moving through walls. . . . Like a worm that eats its way forward, emerging at points and then disappearing.40

For the IDF, the major problem with SOD was the new terminology and methodology. Not every officer in the IDF had the time or the inclination to study postmodern French philosophy. It was questionable whether the majority of IDF officers would grasp a design that Naveh proclaimed was “not intended for ordinary mortals.”41 Many IDF officers thought the entire program elitist, while others could not understand why the old system of simple orders and terminology was being replaced by a design that few could understand.42

After several alterations and revisions, the new IDF doctrine was endorsed and signed by the new Chief of the IDF General Staff, Lieutenant-General Dan Halutz, in April 2006. Halutz was the fi rst IAF officer ever appointed Chief of the IDF General Staff. On the first page of the document, Halutz wrote, “Familiarity with and use of the concept of operation are the key to our success in warfare, in which the only option available is victory. Therefore, the commanding offi cers of the IDF must understand, assimilate and implement what is written there when they call their forces into action and prepare them for their goal.”43 It is possible that not even Halutz understood the new doctrine he endorsed and signed. Naveh explained that the “core of this document is the theory of SOD.”

[p. 37]

Halutz convinced Olmert and Peretz that Israel should strike back against Hezbollah and the Lebanese central government with a substantial air campaign. The plan was not designed to directly or fully crush Hezbollah’s capabilities but to produce “effects” that would force Hezbollah out of southern Lebanon and cause them to disarm.14 Halutz proposed an immense air strike against “symbolic” Lebanese targets and Hezbollah’s military resources. The plan also called for targeted strikes against Hezbollah’s military and political leadership. “His idea,” Naveh stated, “was that . . . we hit all these targets [and] Hezbollah will collapse as a military organization. No one really believed that the Lebanese government was in position to really pressure Hezbollah. The idea was that Hezbollah would give up and then everybody would go home happy. Again, the idea was to change something in the equation; to change the conditions by forcing them to become political and abandon the military option.”15 Hezbollah, however, had prepared for an effects-based campaign, and the Lebanese government was too weak and incapable of challenging Hezbollah. There was simply no lever to pull that would cause Hezbollah to crumple.16

While some Israeli politicians and IDF officers were skeptical of Halutz’s campaign plan, he failed to effectively address or present their doubts to Olmert and Peretz. The Winograd Report maintains Halutz did not reveal substantial deficiencies in the ground forces that may well thwart the success of their mission. Furthermore, he did not adequately address the fact that the military’s own assessment indicated ground operations would most likely be warranted.17

The stage was now set to reveal to the world what one Israeli writer described as “a witches brew of high tech fantasies and basic unpreparedness.”18 …

[p. 45]

… A general on Hulutz’s staff told a reporter on 22 July that “The goal is not necessarily to eliminate every Hezbollah rocket. What we must do is disrupt the military logic of Hezbollah. I would say that this is still not a matter of days away.” Many ground commanders were stunned by the remark and questioned the true aims of the war.10

On the same day the IDF reserve forces were called to duty, Israel was forced to request an emergency resupply of precision-guided missiles from the United States. In 10 days, the IAF had used up most of its high-tech munitions, and yet, this huge expenditure of weaponry did little to change Hezbollah’s “military logic” or its fighting capability. Mossad was already gathering information to leak to the press on 28 July, indicating “Hezbollah had not suffered a significant degradation in its military capabilities, and that the organization might be able to carry on the conflict for several months.”11

… Hezbollah Secretary- Undeterred by the failure of the air campaign and stiff Hezbollah resistance, Halutz and his staff continued efforts to secure a “consciousness of victory” and to deliver to Hezbollah a “cognitive perception of defeat.” …General Nasrallah had delivered his well-known victory speech in Bint Jbeil after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Halutz asserted that capturing the town would prove symbolic and “create a spectacle of victory.” This “spectacle of victory” was undoubtedly designed to effect the cognitive perception of Hezbollah. In the end, however, the battle for Bint Jbeil would have a great deal more effect on the Israeli public’s perception of the IDF’s professionalism and judgment.13 …

… Halutz ordered Adams to “conquer Bint Jbeil” with just one battalion. Adam was infuriated and quickly reminded his commander that “the casbah [old quarter] of Bint Jbail alone contained more than 5,000 houses. And you want me to send in one battalion?” …

[p. 50]

By 5 August, the IDF had approximately 10,000 soldiers in southern Lebanon. In three weeks of war, the ground forces managed to penetrate no farther than four miles. Remarkably, the border zone remained unsecured, as were the towns of Maroun al Ras and Bint Jbeil.34 Yet, the entire Hezbollah force south of the Litani consisted of only 3,000 fighters. Unlike the IDF, Hezbollah did not call on its sizable reserve forces and chose to fight the entire war south of the Litani with its original force of 3,000 men.35 For Israel and the IDF, there was still no “spectacle of victory” or any sign of Hezbollah’s impending defeat. …

… Knowing full well that the war would be over in days and the old border reestablished, Olmert and Peretz made the decision to expand the 52 war effort by ordering their divisions north to the Litani. It was perhaps one of the most bizarre episodes of the war. While the reasoning for the offensive maneuver remains clouded, the move was clearly not designed to annihilate Hezbollah. Ron Tira was certain that “at no point was an order given to systemically and comprehensively deal with the rockets or Hezbollah.”40 It would appear that the IDF was still following Halutz’s “raid” strategy, albeit this time with divisions instead of battalions and brigades.41 Senior IDF officers would later state that the operation was designed as a “Battle of Awareness against Hizbollah.” Others thought the operation was designed as “a kind of show designed to demonstrate to Hizbollah who is the Boss.”42

I’m guessing that my long-term readers have been driven to nausea from my endless ruminations on Lebanon. However, this will go a long way to explaining future US policy shifts away from Israel.

The INSS is presumably a respected and connected part of the Israeli nonprofit think-tank apparatus. While Dan “Derrida” Halutz may have been thrown on his sword, the intellectual arrogance exemplified by Halutz continues to rule Israeli strategy in Halutz’s stead. Not only that, but Israeli commentators (beyond this one) have the chutzpah to blame the United States for such dereliction!

In other news, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah today gave his blessing to “all the resistance fighters in Iraq.” Including, presumably, al Qaeda.

Here’s to Israel.

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Hezbollah’s coup was formalized with Gen. Michel Suleiman’s election today as president of Lebanon. Suleiman directly disobeyed Fouad Siniora’s orders to put down the Hezbollah coup. Siniora and Hariri are finished politically. Druzes and Maronites associated with the pro-Western majority leaders of their factions face dhimmitude and gradual tribal exile.

Western media may, for a time, parrot Jerusalem’s jaw-dropping chutzpah and insist that Hezbollah was weakened by this confrontation. Liberals, unfortunately, often invent ludicrous ex post facto justifications for refusing to stand up to hostile force.

Didn’t kill enough looters in Iraq immediately after the occupation? “Well, the occupation would have been so much more dysfunctional otherwise!”

Positive results of the surge? “That was because the mixed neighborhoods were already totally cleansed anyway, there was no more cleansing to be done!” [Uh. OK.]

Bill Richardson’s hilarious Darfur negotiations broke down immediately after he left? “You don’t know that! He got them to promise a cease-fire–even you would admit that’s better than nothing, right?” [No, because it makes us look naively stupid, as well as impotent.]

No progress on North Korean nukes? “Bush’s “appeasenik” North Korea policy was so much more successful than the Iraq quagmire!” [Actually, it was a combination of NK bluffing the whole way, combined with the threat of fatal Chinese sanctions for significant misbehavior, that are bringing in North Korea from the cold.]

Iran runs the Middle East since we consistently backed down from confronting them? [“splutter… peace process … Palestinians … splutter splutter”]

No doubt, liberals will issue similar pacifism-queered ex post propaganda convincing themselves that, really, Hezbollah lost the world by winning Lebanon. The 101st Appeaseniks must bridge the gap between their relentless egomania and the reality that their cult of peace has, once again, proven an embarrassing failure.

However, a lot of us understand what happened. Israel shirked its near-term obligations for much more extinction a few years down the road. American warships were directly off the Lebanese coast, ready to provide electronic support to Israeli columns.

Mainstream Israeli political coverage is no more predictive than American political coverage. It’s a long-running soap opera in which the best bet — at all times — is against the mainstream media consensus.

The drama of Olmert’s latest trial apparently involves piddling amounts of money transferred between a US Jewish financier, Morris Talansky, and Olmert himself. Presumably this represents an attempted power grab by pro-Likud elements within the Israeli prosecutorial apparatus. More importantly, though, the trial doesn’t seem to be going anywhere.

It’s one thing for Americans, who are so far away from these tribal feuds, to be ignorant of foreign affairs. Israelis, however, seem no less, if not far more naive about prospects for peace than their American counterparts, judging by the popularity of Tzipi Livni’s born-again pacifism. It says a lot about how insulated many Israelis are from Israeli “crises” which inundate Western media.

In any case, in the United States, money talks — more than ever. Israel has less of it than ever, the Arabs more. The neoconservatives lost public credibility years ago, but at this point, they’ve lost credibility with everyone. The Arabists will be running the show from here on out.

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via

Sunday night, May 11, the Israeli army was poised to strike Hizballah. The Shiite militia was winding up its takeover of West Beirut and battling pro-government forces in the North. When he opened the regular cabinet meeting Sunday, May 11, prime minister Ehud Olmert had already received the go-ahead from Washington for a military strike to halt the Hizballah advance. The message said that President George W. Bush would not call off his visit to Israel to attend its 60th anniversary celebrations and would arrive as planned Wednesday, May 14 – even if the Israeli army was still fighting in Lebanon and Hizballah struck back against Tel Aviv and Ben-Gurion airport.

American intelligence estimated that Hizballah was capable of retaliating against northern Israel at the rate of 600 missiles a day.

Olmert, defense minister Ehud Barak and foreign minister Tzipi Lvini, the only ministers in the picture, decided not to intervene in Lebanon’s civil conflict. Iran’s surrogate army consequently waltzed unchecked to its second victory in two years over the United States and Israel.

DEBKAfile’s US and military sources disclose the arguments Washington marshaled to persuade Israel to go ahead: Hizballah, after its electronic trackers had learned from the Israel army’s communication and telephone networks that not a single troop or tank was on the move, took the calculated risk of transferring more than 5,000 armed men from the South to secure the capture of West Beirut.

This presented a rare moment to take Hizballah by surprise, Washington maintained. The plan outlined in Washington was for the Israeli Air force to bombard Hizballah’s positions in the South, the West and southern Beirut. This would give the pro-government Christian, Sunni and Druze forces the opening for a counter-attack. Israeli tanks would simultaneously drive into the South and head towards Beirut in two columns.

1. The western column would take the Tyre-Sidon-Damour-Beirut coastal highway.

2. The eastern column would press north through Nabatiya, Jezzine, Ain Zchalta and Alei.

Sunday night, Olmert called Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora and his allies, the Sunni majority leader Saad Hariri, head of the mainline Druze party Walid Jumblatt and Christian Phalanges chief Samir Geagea and informed them there would be no Israeli strike against Hizballah. Jerusalem would not come to their aid.

According to American sources, the pro-Western front in Beirut collapsed then and there, leaving Hizballah a free path to victory. The recriminations from Washington sharpened day by day and peaked with President Bush’s arrival in Israel.

Our sources report that, behind the protestations of undying American friendship and camaraderie shown in public by the US president, prime minister and Shimon Peres, Bush and his senior aides bitterly reprimanded Israel for its passivity in taking up the military challenge and crushing an avowed enemy in Lebanon.

While the president was busy with ceremonies and speeches, secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and national security adviser Stephen Hadley took Israeli officials to task. Hadley in particular bluntly blamed Israel for the downfall of the pro-Western government bloc in Beirut and its surrender to the pro-Iranian, Pro-Syrian Hizballah. If Israeli forces had struck Hizballah gunmen wile on the move, he said, Hassan Nasrallah would not have seized Beirut and brought the pro-government militias to their knees.

One US official said straight out to Olmert and Barak: For two years, you didn’t raise a finger when Hizballah took delivery of quantities of weapons, including missiles, from Iran and Syria. You did not interfere with Hizballah’s military buildup in southern Lebanon then or its capture of Beirut now.

IDF generals who were present at these conversations reported they have never seen American officials so angry or outspoken. Israel’s original blunder, they said, was its intelligence misreading of Hizballah’s first belligerent moves on May 4. At that point, Israel’s government military heads decided not to interfere, after judging those moves to be unthreatening.

The Americans similarly criticizes Israel for letting Hamas get away with its daily rocket and missile attacks on Israel civilians year after year. A blow to Hizballah would have deterred Hamas from exercising blackmail tactics for a ceasefire. In Sharm el-Sheikh Sunday, May 18, President Bush called on Middle East countries to confront Hamas and isolate terror-sponsors Iran and Syria.

Familiar fecklessness, indeed. We now know what the “miscalculation” was — the pro-Western Lebanese banked on Israel to back them up. But no: Olmert has an election to win. If Lebanese Sunni and Druze, and American soldiers in Iraq, need to die because because Jewish boys are just too precious… well, that’s the problem of the goyim, not the Jews, right? This will not be forgotten.

At least Rice doesn’t have her head as deep in the sand as I thought.

Either Israel knifed us–big time–or the Israeli government’s corrosive dereliction, entitlement mentality , and serial incompetence have infected the core of their intelligence apparatus.

Oh, yeah–it also shows whom Bush was really referring to in his “appeasement” speech last week. Definitely not Obama, probably not Carter, absolutely Olmert.

I guess the Israeli media is too stupid and/or sycophantic to point out that “inconvenient truth.” A democracy at face value only, indeed.

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Iran has puzzled the global oil market by having 20 large tankers filled with crude oil. Why is Iran holding on to so much oil, given what a suppliers’ market oil is right now?

Iranian oil is not just oil. It’s very “heavy”/ “dirty” oil. Iran could coagulate strategic parts of the Persian Gulf with massive dirty oil dumps, which would not only cripple mobility of American CBGs, but would also contaminate the Sunni sheikhdoms’ water desalinization facilities.

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Was just reading Drudge’s OBAMA REAX, where Obama interpreted Bush’s “those who talk, appease” comment as a gutshot at Obama.

My initial reaction, having spent way too much time studying that part of the world, was that Bush’s comment was almost certainly aimed at Ehud Olmert, Tzipi Livni and Shimon Peres — not Obama. General election foreign policy rhetoric, as we have seen, has nothing to do with reality. There’s no way to know whether or not Obama’s an “appeaser” until he actually starts making decisions.

Olmert, on the other hand, has made a slew of appeasing decisions, long after it became screamingly obvious that Israel’s most rational response was a heavy-handed one. The Arabs are furious that the Israelis, given such an obvious opportunity to maul any and every of Iran’s proxies in the region, has repeatedly squandered them.

Considering that Bush’s speech was to the Knesset, in light of mounting Hamas and Hezbollah provocations, it’s fairly clear that Bush was referring to Olmert, not Obama.

Update: here’s the quote in full.

In a speech to Israel’s Knesset, Bush said that “some seem to believe we should negotiate with terrorists and radicals, as if some ingenious argument will persuade them they have been wrong all along … We have an obligation to call this what it is – the false comfort of appeasement, which has been repeatedly discredited by history.”

Responding with a statement, the Obama campaign seized on Bush’s remarks even as it was unclear to whom Bush was referring.

“It is sad that President Bush would use a speech to the Knesset on the 6Oth anniversary of Israel’s independence to launch a false political attack,” Obama said in the statement. “George Bush knows that I have never supported engagement with terrorists, and the president’s extraordinary politicization of foreign policy and the politics of fear do nothing to secure the American people or our stalwart ally Israel.”

The White House said Bush’s comment wasn’t a reference to Obama.

“It is not,” press secretary Dana Perino told reporters in Israel. “I would think that all of you who cover these issues and have for a long time have known that there are many who have suggested these types of negotiations with people that the president, President Bush, thinks that we should not talk to. I understand when you’re running for office you sometimes think the world revolves around you. That is not always true. And it is not true in this case.”

Obama’s definitely not the sole reference here. It gives Olmert some weasel room to help him save face, and probably is a secondary jab at Obama, but I am sure Olmert is the primary reference.

Score a rare point for the White House. Not that I expect the “reality-based community” to bother figuring it out.

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[edited and tempered a bit–EC]

I’ve wanted to talk about something that’s been simmering for a long time in my mind, namely the obvious institutional dysfunction of the West in the face of Muslim, particularly Shia, tribal fortitude.

There are two kinds of societies: unstructured, tribal societies, and structured, institutional societies. The Bush Administration’s Iraq odyssey has allowed vibrant contrast between tribal and institutional societies.

Charisma is the currency of a tribal society; money is the currency of institutional society.

In a tribe, any person’s leadership ability is contingent upon how well he husbands the lives and resources of his tribe in the face of external threats, up to and including throwing himself on the rails to save his family/ unit/ clan/ tribe. A leader’s credibility is based upon 1) his ability to forecast and surmount future threats, and 2) his perceived willingness to die for the tribe’s sake to surmount such a threat — the fact that, as he gambles with his tribe’s lives, he sees his own life no differently from lesser members of the tribe. So, tribal societies generally produce very astute gamblers as leaders.

Institutional societies produce exactly opposite leaders. People rise through institutions by public competence and private ‘politicking’ (what a tribal society would call ‘treachery’). Winning the leadership lottery of an institution is defined by strategically timed risk avoidance, whereas tribal leaders are defined by strategic risk-taking.

Institutions can attain heights of complexity and ‘sophistication,’ be it in the form of weaponry, markets, technology, art, or social ritual, which tribes can only, rarely, hope to rent. For that conceit, institutions pay a steep price. They are extremely slow to adapt to anything. Institutions can scale up intellect, but unlike tribes they cannot scale up trust. Institutions are hamstrung by internal political jockeying to a much greater extent than are tribes.

Because testosterone and charisma are pretty closely correlated, “demographic change” is never a tribal problem. Children are necessary to perpetuate and augment the tribe, and are totally encouraged. People who have difficulty producing children are accepted, but not treated as well. People obviously incapable of producing children, i.e. homosexuals, are ostracized, unless they show exceptional fighting ability/ stand up for themselves. Institutions, which put a premium on an individual’s “paying dues” of time at the expense of everything else, disproportionately produce leaders with few or no children. Institution-driven government policy overwhelmingly discounts from future investment (of which children are a big part) to the present.

Tribal leaders see much more meaning in death — or, in the case of black US tribes, very long-term imprisonment — than do institutional leaders. They know that even if their lives’ works ‘end’ in death, their sacrifice will reflect well upon their “peoples” ie their children.

Because tribal leaders are judged by their ability to defeat external challenges and encroachments on a continuous basis, and are not protected by legal or institutional formalisms, they react immediately and overwhelmingly to, for example, attempts to steal the property of the tribe.

So, institutional societies produce too many “leaders” eager to take credit for vanquishing small risks over small time horizons, and very large risks over extremely long time horizons (i.e., blame/credit cannot be fully allocated until after the leader in question is dead).

You can see where I’m going with this. The Muslim world is defined by its tribes, and the West is defined by its institutions. It would be over-dramatic to call Iraq a clash of civilizations, but it still is, sort of. Who has been winning? Iran certainly hasn’t been losing. The US seems to be holding firm, except that public support for the war has completely collapsed, and the state of the US government’s balance sheet is much worse than any agency seems to realize.

The US government really reminds me a lot of Citigroup: every agency further amortizing the future, on the assumption that, if its bets don’t pay off, every other agency will take cuts for that agency’s mistakes. In musical chairs, somebody has to lose.

I have been raised by, and have benefited from, a structural society. I would like to believe in it. However, Western institutions’ schizophrenic, ill-informed dysfunction has offered a pathetic contrast to the Iranian model. Every all-in challenge by Hezbollah has been met with pathetic procrastination by Israel, the United States, and proxy tribes seduced by Western institutional promises. Olmert’s Israel, which talks about negotiations as it’s hit by Palestinian Katyushas every day, is a particularly dramatic exposition of this, although the rest of the West suffers the same myopic affliction to lesser degrees.

Tribal elements of the West, i.e., Israeli settlers, lower echelons of the US Army Mormons, US “white trash,” and others who for all their faults are proud enough to put their flesh on the line for their homelands, nonetheless can’t help but feel that the institutions which purport to represent them only waste any lives they offer, on the altar of the Kadima/State Department cult of peace.

The “uncultured” “barbarian” tribes have been bleeding the West dry for the last five years. Western firepower is overwhelming, and could have imposed prohibitive costs on Iranian militia-style maneuvering years ago. Why hasn’t it? As if any negotiation can erase the fact that the Western empire has no clothes, and will not defend itself despite getting its teeth spattered onto Beirut’s pavement. [*]

I think Western governments’ increasingly aggressive discounting of the future is a direct byproduct of the institutionalization of Western society. Today, for example, big agribusiness is stealing $300 billion in plain sight. How is this sustainable — let alone acceptable? Is there a point at which it becomes moral to kill these people? S&P has already stated that a Fannie/Freddie bailout alone would cost $400 billion to $1.1 trillion, and would jeopardize the US’s AAA bond rating. There just isn’t the money for these expenses anymore.

Governments discount youth’s earnings in many ways. Government mandated barriers to entry are overwhelmingly protectionism for existing workers at the expense of future workers, and force youth/future workers to seek poorer alternatives. America’s gigantic intergenerational liabilities are another such tax on youth. I posit that growth of government has directly depressed Western birthrates. US native birthrates are collapsing in line with continental Europe’s, as is its growth of government. [**] There is a yawning gap between deep pessimism of Western youth, especially in the United States, and relative optimism of the 55+ crowd. The two groups are facing very different arrays of future liabilities and future payments, that’s for sure.

Maybe that’s the difference. You hear about all the rent seekers all the time, but you don’t hear as much about the ones that are rising. I don’t know. There is an awful lot of rent-seeking going on, but nobody outside the financial industry seems to have a clue about it, or what it will mean for future generations. This has really, really Never Happened Before, except in Japan, and the results were very bad–especially for birth rates.

Maybe you could say that institutions are a necessary evil for especially big societies. In any case, they are no match for the Mideast’s tribal collectives, epitomized by the extremely high-trust tribal institution Hezbollah. The West’s leaders are no match for Ahmadinejad and Nasrallah at all. Sure, there are those who might be if they had the backing of even a cohesive minority of their society, such as Petraeus, but they don’t, because there is no critical mass willing to risk as Ahmadinejad and Nasrallah are. So we continue fighting this stupid, never-ending war, losing money, face, and men all at the same time.

There’s something about the West that makes it unwilling to win wars, and I don’t know what it is.

Or, maybe I should just rename my blog “a neoconservative, mugged by doomsterism.”

[*] again, the notion of action being important now is premised upon a Republican loss in the 2008 presidential election, something approaching a foregone conclusion, which hasn’t seeped into the conventional wisdom yet.

[**] One should take into account the relatively enormous US local governments, nonprofit sector, and government contractors when arriving at a size of US government. The latter two in particular have exploded over the past eight years.

The sum total will likely surpass 40 percent of GDP this year, and will explode in an Obama Administration as opaque liabilities from the financial bailout make themselves more apparent later.

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